



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STAFF NOTES:

Soviet Union Eastern Europe

DOS review(s) completed.

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SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE

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Brezhnev To Give Main Address At Congress

The Soviet Communist Party Central Committee announced yesterday that General Secretary Brezhnev will deliver the main report at the party congress that opens February 24. Premier Kosygin will speak on the next five-year economic plan (1976-80). This is the standard pattern for a party congress.

The Central Committee did not announce the agenda last April when it set a date for the congress, perhaps because of uncertainty over topics and speakers. The announcement now that Brezhnev will speak indicates that, health permitting, he will be in office through the congress, although it does not carry any implications for the period that follows.

Brezhnev made his customary address to the end-of-the-year plenum yesterday, but the text of his speech probably will not be made public. At the meeting, the Central Committee approved next year's economic plan and budget; the Supreme Soviet begins discussion of them today.

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Yugoslavia: Waiting Out Moscow on the
European Communist Conference

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[redacted] Belgrade sees time running on the side of the independent-minded parties in the preparations for a European Communist Conference.

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[redacted] Belgrade expected the conference to convene in June or July 1976. [redacted] a strengthening of the numbers and unity of those European parties most active in opposing Moscow argues for a stand-pat position in future working sessions.

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This week the Yugoslav party journal *Komunist* carries a long article by Aleksandr Grlickov, Tito's negotiator at the preparatory meetings, which maintains that while the chief obstacle to the conference had been eliminated, "a considerable amount of difficulties" remain. He expressed optimism, however, that if the current procedure of decisions by consensus is followed, the conference could end with historically significant alterations within the communist movement. He insisted that, in any event, no return to old relationships--i.e., subservience to Moscow--is possible, adding that "even the idea of harmonizing the parties' foreign policies" is an anachronism.

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The Romanians and Emigration

Bucharest is in something of a quandary over how to reconcile its tight internal controls with the requirements of MFN and with CSCE provisions on freer movements of people.

In what appears to be a major--although probably temporary--breakthrough, Bucharest approved in November an additional 357 persons for emigration to the US. The total number of those given permission to leave for the US this year now stands at 1,077.

The embassy in Bucharest speculates, and we agree, that this big increase in approvals does not mean there has been a fundamental change in Romania's attitude toward freer emigration. It is more likely a short-term effort to comply with the emigration requirements of the Trade Act, upon which granting of MFN is conditional. Bucharest may also believe that other benefits of closer cooperation with the US can be enhanced by a somewhat more liberal emigration policy.

The relaxation of emigration controls could spell new problems for the Ceausescu regime. The embassy points out that as more Romanians are granted permission to leave, expectations rise among those left behind, and Bucharest may have problems meeting a growing number of requests to emigrate.

The publicity given the freer movement of people and reuniting of families arising from CSCE has boosted popular expectations--in one case, from an unexpected direction. The Romanian consul in Kiev claims that some 20,000 ethnic Romanians in Soviet Moldavia have applied for reunification with their families in Romania. Most applicants, who

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have no first-hand knowledge of conditions across the border, are said to view Romania as a "paradise." Local Soviet officials are reportedly handling the problem by threatening applicants with loss of employment and housing. The situation is difficult for Bucharest, which does not want to countenance discrimination against ethnic Romanians, but fears the consequences of large scale ethnic Romanian emigration on its own minority nationalities and on its historic claim to Soviet Moldavia.

The Romanian consul's story cannot be confirmed, but the US embassy believes it is plausible. The 20,000 figure, however, appears high; it may have been inflated by counting the number of inquiries along with actual applications.

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Bulgaria Conducts Census
as Belgrade Watches

Sofia is proceeding with a "population and housing census" that, Belgrade fears, will omit a category for Macedonians. Such an omission would end the lull in Yugoslav polemics over the sensitive Macedonian question that has prevailed since Foreign Minister Mladenov visited Belgrade last month [REDACTED]

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The census begins today, but detailed results probably will not be published for at least a year. It is the first survey since 1965, when Sofia reported that only 8,750 citizens had declared themselves "Macedonians." Nine years earlier, 187,729 had so identified themselves. Since the 1965 survey, the Yugoslavs have repeatedly castigated Bulgaria for its policy of "cultural assimilation" of the minorities within its borders. Belgrade also sees Sofia's stubborn refusal to recognize the Macedonians as a separate nationality as a veiled threat to its own Macedonian Republic.

The Bulgarian regime, which recognizes its vulnerability to the Yugoslav charges, has ascribed the decrease in those reporting themselves as Macedonians to a heightened "national consciousness" among all elements of the country's population. The Bulgarians, in announcing the census, said that it is being conducted according to "international norms." This is probably a response to a recent Yugoslav attack on Bulgaria for using terrorist and police state methods to coerce Macedonians into declaring themselves as Bulgarians [REDACTED]

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Belgrade's latest official commentary, although more moderate in tone, nevertheless puts Sofia on notice that the Yugoslavs view the census as a barometer of the current state of bilateral relations. A

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Tanjug press report notes that a census in which "everyone has full freedom to declare his nationality" will be an "indicator of (Bulgaria's) political readiness" to make some headway in resolving the two countries' long-standing dispute.

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ANNEXSOVIET ACTIVITY IN ASIA
(October - November)China

Moscow seems less anxious about the President's trip to Peking than any high-level Sino-US meeting since 1971. Should some breakthrough occur during the visit, no one will be more surprised or upset than the Soviets.

One measure of Moscow's more relaxed attitude toward the Sino-US relationship is the way Soviet propagandists played Secretary Kissinger's visit to Peking last month. They seemed particularly delighted that the Secretary defended detente and the results of the European Security Conference. In contrast to its past tactics, Moscow did not go out of its way to mute deep-rooted Sino-Soviet differences. The Soviet message to the Chinese on China's National Day reverted to the harsh tone used in 1973, and while the Secretary was in Peking, *Pravda* carried an article pointing out that there had been no river navigations talks this year and that there were problems negotiating this year's trade agreement. More recently, the Soviets revealed that the Foreign Ministry had sent yet another message to the Chinese regarding the helicopter crew China has detained since March 1974.

Moscow's relative equanimity regarding the Sino-US relationship is largely a result of its conclusion that despite recent setbacks in Soviet-US relations, the USSR has been more successful than Peking in developing ties with Washington. The Soviets may also calculate that the trend toward skepticism about detente will also inhibit the development of US-China relations.

The Soviets are nevertheless worried about speculation in the US regarding military cooperation with

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the Chinese. [REDACTED]

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The Soviets have always feared that the Sino-US rapprochement might eventually result in some cooperation in the military sphere [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The Soviets are aware that China's present military forces--both conventional and strategic--pose no offensive threat to the USSR, but they are not sure that all Chinese recognize China's military inferiority and are horrified at the prospect that the US might share military technology with the Chinese.

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The Soviet press in recent years has begun to prepare the Soviet public to expect no significant improvement in Sino-Soviet relations after the death of Mao and/or Chou. Some Soviet officials [REDACTED] argue that once Mao and Chou go, there is a good chance that China will revert to the xenophobic policies of the Cultural Revolution while the radicals and moderates fight it out. During this period, which, they say, could last from 7-10 years, China will probably be hostile to both the US and the USSR. They apparently base their judgement on an assessment that the leftists in China are more powerful than generally recognized and that Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping is only a transitional figure who faces considerable opposition from leftists and younger cadre. Other Soviet officials, however, foresee a more moderate leadership in China and a greater prospect of improved relations after Mao.

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Despite the differing assessments, all Soviets seem to agree that changes in Chinese leadership will

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take place in the next year or so, and Moscow seems willing to stand put and wait to see what happens. Moscow's negotiator at the border talks, Deputy Foreign Minister Ilichev, spent less time in Peking this year than any year since the talks began in 1969, and there is no evidence that he carried any new proposals on the border problem. In fact, the Soviets have not made a new offer since 1973.

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Mongolia

On October 2 the Soviets and Mongolia signed a protocol on the coordination of their respective five-year plans for 1976-80. Similar protocols have been signed with all the CEMA members, but the Soviet economic role in Mongolia is more extensive than in any of the other countries. Almost all of the modern sector of Mongolia's economy has been built by and for the Soviets and their East European allies. Ninety-eight percent of Mongolia's foreign trade is conducted with CEMA member countries. Russian cultural influence is strong. Most television available in Ulan Bator is broadcast in Russian directly from the USSR, Russian language training is compulsory in all schools beyond the fourth grade, and there are more Russian than Mongolian language books available in Ulan Bator.

Mongolia continues to try to embellish its sovereign status by signing agreements and establishing diplomatic relations with anyone willing--except for the US. It has been more than a year and a half since the Mongolians replied to the last US note on the subject.

Moscow's decision to veto--if that is what is involved--the establishment of a US mission in Ulan Bator is hard to understand since the Soviets have been pushing for international recognition of Mongolia and US recognition would become another irritant in Sino-US relations. Moscow may have had second thoughts, however, about calling Western attention to the state of Mongolia's dependency on the USSR, and the roughly 35,000 Soviet troops they have stationed in Mongolia since 1965.

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Japan

As it became more apparent that the Sino-Japanese treaty negotiations are stalemated, the Soviets muted their propaganda on the anti-hegemony issue, but remained tough in private. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Soviet officials maintain--with greater plausibility--that there will be no high-level Soviet visits to Japan until there is some prospect for progress on the political problems dividing the two countries.

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The Northern Territories issue is a difficult one to resolve. Moscow in recent months has been very uncompromising in public, and the Japanese have reacted sharply, particularly to the article by Foreign Minister Gromyko in the October issue of *Kommunist*. [REDACTED]

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The Soviets also reacted toughly to China's continuing efforts to stir up public sentiment against the Soviets in northern Japan. *Izvestia* in early October condemned the mayor of Nemuro for his remarks on the Northern Territories question, and the Soviets subsequently canceled a planned visit to Nemuro in order to demonstrate their displeasure. The measures apparently had some effect because subsequently a local politician who is interested in expanding trade with both China and the USSR decided to postpone a planned visit to China.

Moscow's toughness on the territorial question is doubtless related to its campaign against the

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anti-hegemony clause, although the Soviets have not explicitly linked the two. By taking the tough line on the territorial question, the Soviets, however, probably hope to impress upon the Japanese the consequences of signing the anti-hegemony clause.

SOUTH ASIA

Afghanistan

In a conversation with the US ambassador in November, Soviet Ambassador Puzanov was relaxed about Daoud's purge of leftist officials.

25X1

[Redacted] Soviet Chief of State Podgorny will pay an official visit to Kabul sometime before Christmas. The trip is not expected to result in any special announcements on Soviet-Afghan relations; it is largely reciprocity for President Daoud's visit to Moscow in June, 1974.

Bangladesh

The Soviets are very concerned about the political instability in Bangladesh since the early November coups. Bengalee President Sayem assured the Soviet ambassador that he wanted to continue and expand relations with the Soviet Union while maintaining Dacca's official policy of nonalignment. Moscow's real concern, however, lies more with the ability of the Bengalee leadership to gain control over the dissident elements of the population and restore some semblance of order to the country than with the possibility of a change in foreign policy. Moscow has taken a strong propaganda line highly critical of the alleged influence of Maoist extremists and right-wing factions

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in fostering further uprest and in promoting anti-Soviet and anti-Indian feelings within Bangladesh. Official Soviet policy, however, has undergone little change since the political upheavals. Moscow will continue to trade with and provide some economic assistance to Dacca. Ministry of Foreign Affairs South Asian expert Yuriy Filipov acknowledged that these efforts are insignificant in light of the country's enormous problems.

India

Discussions on terms for the Indo-Soviet trade plan for 1976-1980 were held in Moscow in mid-October. In a surprise move, the Soviets agreed to accept exports of Indian goods in lieu of grain for repayment of their 2 million ton wheat loan. The agreement is expected to be concluded during the December round of trade talks in New Delhi.

The Soviets are irritated by India's persistent public references to "great power rivalry" in the Indian Ocean, and have expressed an interest in holding further discussions to clear up this trouble spot. Kewal Singh, the Indian foreign secretary, arrived in Moscow on November 22 for bilateral consultations. The last Indo-Soviet talks at this level were held in 1974.

Moscow has supported India's version of the Sino-Indian border clash on October 20. Initial Soviet reports on the incident were relatively straightforward, but more recent reporting has portrayed the incident as proof of China's hegemonistic ambitions in Asia and has reminded people of China's territorial claims against India and other Asian countries.

An article in *Pravda* on November 22 implied support for India in its territorial dispute with the Chinese. The Soviets have been edging in this direction since 1973, when for the first time a Soviet

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journal published an article supporting India's territorial claims against the Chinese, but despite considerable Indian pressure they still have not come out authoritatively on behalf of India. Most Soviet maps still show the disputed areas as belonging to the Chinese, although one has been printed which intentionally places the map's legend in the space where the disputed area should be.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

Vietnam

Soviet-Vietnamese relations appear greatly strengthened as a result of Hanoi party chief Le Duan's official visit to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (October 27 - November 21). The Soviets went all out to give the impression that they and the Vietnamese hold identical views. Hanoi is undoubtedly committed to an independent stance, but Le Duan seemed willing to go along with Moscow's propaganda buildup indissolubly linking the two countries in order to receive much needed aid. Le Duan's explicit support for Soviet detente policies in the joint communique particularly pleased Moscow.

The Soviets will supply Hanoi with credit on easy terms as well as establish a metallurgical center and petroleum refinery should preliminary explorations prove these projects worthwhile. Another by-product of the talks seems to be a more visibly active role in CEMA for Hanoi, although North Vietnam has spurned, and probably will continue to spurn full CEMA membership. The expanded relationship, which may well be largely cosmetic, includes economic plan coordination with CEMA member countries, participation in some CEMA permanent commissions and multilateral aid projects.

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interest in having Soviet research ships put into Vietnamese ports. The Soviets may not have any secret desire for bases, facilities or whatever in Vietnam, but they cannot fail to recognize that any kind of regular use of Vietnamese facilities for their ships will be open to more malevolent interpretation, namely as the camel's nose under the tent. Indeed, to create the impression of such a relationship with Vietnam may be precisely what Moscow is after. The Soviets may hope that a negative Chinese reaction would only cause the Vietnamese to lean closer to Moscow.

Cambodia

Soviet relations with Cambodia remain poor, and one Soviet official said recently that Moscow would not be allowed to open an embassy in Phnom Penh in the near future. He acknowledged that at present the Chinese have the dominant voice in Cambodia, but speculated--a bit hopefully, one suspects--that this influence would decline since Peking does not control the party or the army. The Cambodians are still bitter about Moscow's lack of support during the war. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Phnom Penh has already rejected a number of Soviet overtures for an early normalization of relations. [REDACTED] even after relations are established, the Cambodian government will be careful to limit Soviet influence.

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Laos

Moscow continues to ply Laos with economic assistance in an effort to shore up its position in Southeast Asia. Two AN-2 planes were presented to the Lao Patriotic Front in late October. The Soviets are also building a new town in Khang Khay, which some speculate could become the new Lao administrative capitol, and have promised assistance for other construction projects. As part of their foreign aid program, the Soviets have agreed to provide Laos with the foreign exchange necessary to

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purchase petroleum products from Shell Oil Company. Soviet technicians and North Vietnamese troops have been especially active in Savannakhet Province, where they are building an airstrip.

Indonesia

Indonesia announced this month that it was willing to accept a Soviet offer of credit exceeding \$100 million to finance and build two hydroelectric projects in Java. This would be the first Soviet aid to Jakarta since 1965. Aleksey Okonishnikov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Asian expert, told an American embassy official on November 19 that Soviet ties with Indonesia were "normal" and that there has been a gradual improvement in relations. He denied that the question of possible Soviet military aid to Indonesia had been raised.

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Moscow has been slow to take an official stand on the Portuguese Timor issue, although it has demonstrated some sympathy for Fretilin in the press.

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Singapore

Singapore plans to allow Soviet merchant ships access to the Sembawang repair yard unless Malaysia agrees to bar Soviet merchantmen from its new port facility in the Straits of Johore. Soviet warships, however, will continue to be denied access to the shipyard and the Straits. Singapore's reversal is prompted by economic considerations. Sembawang has become increasingly unprofitable because of the slowdown in the shipping business.

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CHRONOLOGY

November 25

Czechoslovak party/state leader Husak begins a five-day visit to the USSR; he and Brezhnev have their opening round of talks. [REDACTED]

25X1

FRG Chancellor Schmidt signs a joint declaration with visiting Bulgarian party/state leader Zhivkov; the two sides announce signature of economic and cultural cooperation agreements. [REDACTED]

25X1

Secretary of Agriculture Butz begins a four-day, official visit to Poland. [REDACTED]

25X1

Romanian President Ceausescu's state visit to Kuwait--scheduled to commence today--is postponed, apparently because a proposed trade agreement fell through. [REDACTED]

25X1

Polish Foreign Trade Minister Olszewski commences a five-day, official visit to Egypt. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Politburo candidate-member Ponomarev confers with visiting fed-ayeen leader Arafat. [REDACTED]

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November 26

Foreign Minister Gromyko confers for more than four hours with visiting fedayeen leader Arafat. [REDACTED]

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November 26

[redacted]
al, unofficial" basis that the
total Soviet grain harvest for
1975 is in the range of 160-162
million metric tons. [redacted]

25X6

Politburo member Kirilenko heads
the official Soviet turnout in
Moscow for the observance of
Yugoslavia's republic day. [redacted]

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Brezhnev confers in Moscow with
Kewal Singh, number-two man in
the Indian Foreign Ministry. [redacted]

Egyptian-Soviet debt rescheduling
negotiations are adjourned after
a one-hour session to permit "refer-
ence by the two parties to their
governments." [redacted]

25X1

Soviet ship Gorizont sinks in the
English Channel after colliding
with a Moroccan tanker; the Soviet
vessel refused assistance by a
British destroyer. [redacted]

25X1

Soviet dissident physicist Andrey
Sakharov announces that he has
authorized his wife to accept the
Nobel Peace Prize for him in Oslo
on December 10. [redacted]

25X1

US and Soviet representatives con-
vene in Washington for bilateral
talks on Law of the Sea issues.
[redacted]

25X1

November 27

Czechoslovak party/state leader
Husak and delegation commence a
tour of the USSR by flying to
Minsk. [redacted]

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November 27

Romanian President Ceausescu commences a five-day, state visit to Iran. [REDACTED]

25X1

East German party's Central Committee completes a two-day plenum in East Berlin, endorsing drafts of the economic plans for both 1976 and the 1976-80 period and revisions in the party's program and statutes. [REDACTED]

25X1

A *Pravda* commentary--signed I. Aleksandrov to convey a Politburo endorsement--denies any Soviet support for dissident elements in Yugoslavia. [REDACTED]

25X1

Hungarian President Losonczi concludes a state visit to Libya and begins one to Tunisia, meeting with President Bourguiba soon after his arrival. [REDACTED]

25X1

Brezhnev receives the "gold medal of peace" from the Communist-front World Peace Council in well-publicized ceremonies at the Kremlin. [REDACTED]

25X1

US and Poland announce agreement for Warsaw's annual purchase of 2.5 million tons of grain subject to US crop availability. [REDACTED]

25X1

November 28

Bulgarian party/state leader Zhivkov completes his five-day visit to West Germany. [REDACTED]

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November 28

Soviet-Romanian economic planning coordination protocol for the 1976-80 period is signed in Moscow. [REDACTED]

25X1

Fedayeen leader Arafat arrives in Budapest for a two-day visit after completing a five-day stay in the USSR. [REDACTED]

25X1

Kowal Singh, number-two man in the Indian Foreign Ministry, completes a week-long, official visit to the USSR. [REDACTED]

25X1

November 29

Standing commissions of the USSR Supreme Soviet meet in Moscow in preparation for the Supreme Soviet session opening on December 2. [REDACTED]

25X1

Czechoslovak President Husak flies home from Leningrad, completing a five-day, state visit to the USSR. [REDACTED]

25X1

November 30

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US delegation arrives in Moscow for bilateral maritime negotiations. [REDACTED]

25X1

Hungary announces retail price increases that will take effect over the next year. [REDACTED]

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November 30

Czechoslovak Foreign Minister
Chnoupek begins a five-day, of-
ficial visit to India. [REDACTED]

25X1

Soviet, West German, and Iranian
negotiators sign in Tehran "con-
tracts for the world's largest
triangular gas deal." [REDACTED]

25X1.

December

Brezhnev addresses a CPSU Central
Committee meeting in Moscow; the
agenda and principal speaker for
the party congress--Brezhnev--are
announced. [REDACTED]

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Turkish Prime Minister Demirel
begins a three-day, official visit
to Bulgaria. [REDACTED]

25X1

December 2

Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Sabah
begins an official visit to the
USSR. [REDACTED]

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USSR Supreme Soviet convenes in
Moscow to approve the 1976 plan
and budget. [REDACTED]

25X1

Romanian party's Central Committee
convenes in Bucharest. [REDACTED]

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FUTURE EVENTS

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December 3

Bulgarian parliament to convene. [REDACTED]

Yugoslav Foreign Minister Minic
to begin a three-day visit to the
Netherlands. [REDACTED]

25X1

Romania's Grand National Assembly
to convene in Bucharest. [REDACTED]

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December 4 West German Foreign Minister Genscher to begin a two-day, official visit to Romania. [redacted] 25X1

December 5 East German *Volkakammer* to convene in East Berlin; one order of business will be approval of the national economic plan for 1976. [redacted] 25X1

early December President Podgorny to make a state visit to Afghanistan. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted]

December 8 Polish party congress to open in Warsaw with party chief Gierek delivering the keynote speech; several East European party leaders are likely to be on hand. [redacted] 25X1

Yugoslav Foreign Minister Minic to begin a four-day, official visit to the USSR. [redacted] 25X1

Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Chnoupek to begin an official visit to Afghanistan on his way back to Eastern Europe. [redacted] 25X1

Czechoslovak Premier Strougal to go to Yugoslavia for official talks, largely on economic subjects. [redacted] 25X1

December 9 General Secretary Brezhnev and Polish Premier Jaroszewicz to address the Polish party congress. [redacted] 25X1

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A "working group" to convene in East Berlin for further consideration of a draft of the final document for the proposed European Communist party conference. [REDACTED]

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December 19

Brezhnev to mark his 69th birthday. [REDACTED]

late December

Indo-Soviet trade agreement for 1976-80 to be signed. [REDACTED]

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January 1

USSR's "financial aid tax" on remittances from abroad to go in-to effect. [REDACTED]

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